Citizenship by descent (Iure Sanguinis) and the 2025 Reform: The Constitutional Court takes the floor

Can someone who has already filed an application lose the right to citizenship?

According to the Ministry of the Interior, Decree-Law No. 36/2025 should also apply to pending proceedings, implicitly supporting a retroactive effect. To justify this stance, it referred to an institutionally sensitive issue: the “need” to await the Constitutional Court‘s decision on the legitimacy of the new Act.

In other words, the State argued that the 2025 law changes the rules even for those who had already begun their process of obtaining citizenship under the previous legal framework. A position which, if accepted, would have had a profound impact on the protection of legitimate expectations and on legal certainty.

But the Court of Campobasso firmly rejected this interpretation. And it did not merely dismiss the objection raised by the Ministry: it substantiated its decision with exceptional legal clarity and a strong reference to the principles of consistency within the legal system.

The Court of Campobasso protects those who have already submitted their application — and it does not stop there.

The case was addressed by the Court of Campobasso in judgment no. 375/2025 of 2 May. The application for citizenship, submitted in 2024, preceded the entry into force of Decree-Law no. 36/2025.

The judge excluded the application of the new rules on both textual grounds—the rule applies only to applications submitted after 27 March 2025—and on systemic grounds, based on the general principle of non-retroactivity of the Law. As stated in the reasoning: “The new regulation does not apply to the present case […] also considering the general principle of non-retroactivity of the Law, which only operates for the future” (Art. 11 Preliminary Provisions).

Additionally, the Court observed that the decree contains no explicit retroactivity clause and that, at the time, the act was still undergoing conversion. For these reasons, the ruling stated:”It would be wholly unreasonable to attempt to interpret and decide on applications subject to the previous rules in light of the new ones“.

Although formally limited to applications submitted before 27 March 2025, the decision suggests a broader principle: the true reference point is the maturation of the right. If the right to citizenship had already been perfected under the previous act, it cannot be annulled retroactively.

This interpretation aligns with that of the Court of Turin, which has raised constitutional doubts about the new act where it undermines already consolidated subjective rights, violating the principles of reasonableness, legitimate expectations, and legal identity.

A ruling that reinforces legal coherence

Though dealing with a specific case, the ruling by the Court of Campobasso sits within a particularly sensitive legal and institutional context. The judge did not merely apply the transitional provision of Decree-Law No. 36/2025 but based the decision on a broader and structural principle: that of legal reasonableness.

This principle requires the legislator not to retroactively overturn existing rules, in order to protect legitimate expectations and the coherence of the legal system.From this perspective, the judgment does not offer a definitive resolution on constitutionality, but it outlines a threshold of legitimacy, beyond which legislative intervention risks becoming arbitrary.

Thus, the decision is an example of a judiciary that avoids disruption and instead safeguards the balance between legislation and fundamental legal principles, reaffirming that every new legal provision must be measured against higher principles: legal certainty, protection of legitimate reliance, and proportionality.

This balance—between legislative innovation and vested subjective rights—is now central to the much-anticipated review before the Constitutional Court.

Heading toward constitutional review

The decision of the Court of Campobasso fits within a Case-Law context marked by significant interpretive uncertainty. The new citizenship rules have indeed raised numerous constitutional legitimacy concerns, regarding both the rules prior to 28 March 2025 and those that followed, prompting several courts to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court.

Specifically, the following referral orders are noteworthy: the Ordinary Court of Bologna, Immigration and EU Citizens’ Free Movement Section, 26 November 2024 (Reg. ord. No. 247/2024, OJ Special Series No. 4/2025); the Ordinary Court of Milan, Twelfth Specialized Section, 3 March 2025 (Reg. ord. No. 66/2025, OJ Special Series No. 16/2025); the Ordinary Court of Florence, Specialized Section, 7 March 2025 (Reg. ord. No. 86/2025, OJ Special Series No. 18/2025); the Ordinary Court of Rome, Personal Rights and Immigration Section, 21 March 2025 (Reg. ord. No. 65/2025, OJ Special Series No. 16/2025); and the Ordinary Court of Turin, Immigration and International Protection Section, 25 June 2025.

The Constitutional Court must now issue a definitive ruling on the legitimacy of Decree-Law No. 36/2025. In the meantime, several legal principles are already emerging as likely to guide the Court’s assessment:

• Reasonableness and non-arbitrariness of Law (Art. 3 Const.): Law must not introduce unreasonable distinctions or produce effects disproportionate to its stated aims.
• Protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty (Art. 2 Const.): Those who acquired rights under the existing legal framework should not be stripped of them due to subsequent legislative changes.
• Prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of citizenship (Arts. 22 and 117 Const.): Citizenship is part of a person’s legal identity, and the State, also bound by international obligations, cannot deprive individuals of it arbitrarily.
• International principles and european citizenship supranational: norms—such as Art. 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, Art. 9 of the TEU, and Art. 20 of the TFEU—forbid arbitrary deprivation of citizenship and recognize European citizenship as a separate legal status.

From this perspective, several judges appear to agree that the right to citizenship iure sanguinis, perfected under the previous Act, deserves enhanced protection. It now falls to the Constitutional Court to determine whether—and to what extent—legislative reform may affect already vested rights.